On the 4th and 5th of December 2025, a group of European experts and activists from countries facing repressive legislation gathered to discuss the worldwide phenomenon of closing civic space and the European response to this worrying trend and systematic challenge to democratic norms. As civil society support remains a cornerstone of the EU’s external action—integral to its commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law—this gathering was part of a broader policy dialogue aimed at evaluating the adequacy and effectiveness of EU support to civil society. In the months ahead, EPD will continue facilitating this process through bilateral meetings with key stakeholders, as well as knowledge-exchange and foresight workshops.

10 key takeaways emerged from the retreat, underscoring the need for unwavering commitment to supporting civil society, the vital role of diplomatic engagement, and the importance of reassessing the expectations, approach, modalities and objectives of civil society support.


Note: These priorities have become ever more relevant in the wake of the abrupt dismantling of USAID, which took place while the EPD research team was finalising this document. We want to stay true to what was actually discussed during the retreat, but we invite the reader to interpret these takeaways against the new geopolitical backdrop, which poses a whole new set of challenges not only for civil society worldwide but also for the EU itself, who has apparently lost a key ally in its efforts to promote democracy and human rights.


  1. Continuing to invest in and stand firm in support of civil society | A vibrant and resilient civil society is the cornerstone of every democracy and the strongest safeguard against autocratisation. As repressive regimes grow increasingly organised, well-funded, and mutually supportive, donors must remain steadfast in their political and financial backing of civil society. By continuing to champion and invest in civil society, the EU can help civil society overcome the odds and foster an environment where democratic values thrive, enabling communities to shape brighter, freer futures.

  2. Engaging in constant dialogue with civil society to adapt to continuously evolving repressive tactics | Diplomats report being well informed of the early warning signs of closing civic space while civil society organisations report not being listened to for months. The international community needs to further develop its communication channels with civil society - sharing information, strategies and feedback - in order to better prepare for different scenarios and react accordingly. This continuous engagement with civil society is also key to providing timely and adapted assistance to civil society organisations who must continuously adapt to the new repressive tools and tactics designed and implemented by authoritarian governments. More specifically, in order to counter ‘foreign agent laws’ and the smear campaigns that repressive regimes run in parallel, donors and civil society organisations can reclaim the initiative by working together and developing their strategic communications’ capacity to design new positive narratives with the power of reversing the situation.

  3. Appreciating the value of continuous diplomatic engagement | External funding is often vital to sustain civil society. Yet the value of diplomatic engagement with governments - in the process raising awareness on the importance of consulting and working with civil society - can be just as valuable as funding when it comes to opening civic space and strengthening civil society.

  4. Making cautious use of political and economic leverage | ****Civil society cannot be expected to pressure repressive regimes on its own. Still, donors must learn to exert their political and economic leverage with caution, otherwise running the risk of facing a public backlash and / or having to withdraw and lose their influence altogether. In the case of the EU, it is crucial to show consistency and willingness to walk the talk to avoid becoming a paper tiger that rarely enforces its human rights related sanctions due to trade concerns. Still, donors should consider refining and expanding their toolbox of targeted sanctions to enhance their effectiveness and limit the risk of facing backlash: This requires not only strengthening existing measures but also developing more precise, flexible, and context-specific instruments that minimize unintended consequences while maximizing pressure on authoritarian actors with the collaboration of local civil society.

  5. Navigating the political implications of other cooperation programs | Support to civil society can neither be designed nor effectively implemented without taking into consideration the political implications of other forms of development assistance, and particularly technical assistance to partner governments. Such programs, which tend to strengthen the executive branch, may unintentionally act as a lifeline for repressive regimes, which often view civil society as a rival source of influence and may seek to weaken it. To address these dynamics, technical assistance programs should acknowledge their unintended political effects on the distribution of power within societies and include meaningful mechanisms to engage with and support civil society.

  6. Committing to rebuild independent media landscapes | A strong media sector, able to inform the public and hold power accountable is vital to a resilient civil society and healthy democracy. Yet, in most countries, media outlets are underfunded and vulnerable to capture by private interest groups, often becoming springboards for oligarchs to launch their political careers. Supporting independent media organizations and empowering them to explore and develop sustainable business models can help create a resilient media landscape that can resist and thwart closing civic space.

  7. Supporting the development of grounded civil societies that engage with youth | The most effective civil society organisations are first and foremost accountable to the citizens they serve and as a result recognized for the social and / or political role they play. Thus, civil society support should cater to existing civil society organisations whose development approaches are grounded and adapted to their contexts. Otherwise, by promoting their own exogenous priorities, donors run the risk of distorting the accountability mechanisms and in the process disconnecting civil society from the primary concerns of their constituencies. In this light, donors must encourage civil organisations to engage with youth and younger activists as a way of renewing the sector and continuously connecting it with new constituencies.

  8. Encouraging innovation on the long term to strengthen informal movements | ****Traditional civil society organizations (CSOs) are not the only drivers of change—informal movements, grassroots networks, and digital activism are increasingly shaping civic space. However, these movements often struggle with receiving support from donors due to their decentralised structures and lack of formal funding channels. Donors should explore ways to provide flexible, long-term support that enable these movements to remain agile and innovative.

  9. Rethinking how the impact of civil society support is measured | If civil society support is about investing in organizations that can either incrementally contribute to change or catalyze sudden breakthroughs, then monitoring mechanisms must evolve accordingly. The current emphasis on top-line impact indicators and financial sustainability often stifles innovation, resilience, and grassroots action. Donors must find the right balance between ensuring accountability and allowing for creativity and flexibility.

  10. Improving the coordination between EU initiatives in support of civil society | The EU and its Member States, as well as other likeminded donors, have developed a comprehensive ecosystem of mechanisms and initiatives to support civic space abroad. These initiatives can provide both short and long term support, protect activists and CSOs against closures of civic space, but are mostly reactive and seldom anticipate downturns. The deployment of the EU SEE Early Warning Mechanism could be a first step towards an integrated multi-stakeholder approach capable of delivering coordinated and timely responses to civic space closures and able to anticipate openings to promote an enabling environment for civil society.